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Abstract—We present ARCHANGEL; a novel distributed
ledger based system for assuring the long-term integrity of digital
video archives. First, we introduce a novel deep network archi-
tecture using a hierarchical attention autoencoder (HAAE) to
compute temporal content hashes (TCHs) from minutes or hour-
long audio-visual streams. Our TCHs are sensitive to accidental
or malicious content modification (tampering). The focus of our
self-supervised HAAE is to guard against content modification
such as frame truncation or corruption but ensure invariance
against format shift (i.e. codec change). This is necessary due
to the curatorial requirement for archives to format shift video
over time to ensure future accessibility. Second, we describe how
the TCHs (and the models used to derive them) are secured
via a proof-of-authority blockchain distributed across multiple
independent archives. We report on the efficacy of ARCHANGEL
within the context of a trial deployment in which the national
government archives of the United Kingdom, United States of
America, Estonia, Australia and Norway participated.
Index Terms—Distributed Ledger Technology, Content aware
hashing, autoencoder, LSTM, attention network, content in-
tegrity, blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
ARCHIVES are the lens through which future generationswill perceive the events of today. Increasingly those
events are captured in digital video form, raising new chal-
lenges around the assurance of trust, immutability and long
term accessibility of digital video records [1]. Digital video
formats are ephemeral requiring regular format shifting (video
transcoding) as part of an archive’s curatorial duty to keep
content accessible as the years go by. Additionally, the volume
and intangibility of digital video leaves it open to modification
(tampering) – either due to malicious attack, or accidental
corruption during bulk transcoding processes.
This paper proposes ARCHANGEL; a novel de-centralised
system to guard against tampering of digital video within
archives, using a permissioned blockchain maintained collab-
oratively by several independent archive institutions. We pro-
pose a novel deep neural network (DNN) architecture trained
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to distil an audio-visual signature (content hash) from video,
that is sensitive to tampering, but invariant to the format i.e.
the video codec used to compress the video. Video signatures
are computed and stored immutably within the ARCHANGEL
blockchain at the time of the video’s ingestion to the archive.
The video can be verified against its original signature at any
time during curation, including at the point of public release,
to ensure the integrity of content.
The motivation of this paper is based on the needs for
national government archives to retain video records for years
or even decades. For example, records of the supreme court
proceedings in the United Kingdom are born-digital. These
records are held in the National Archives for 5 years prior
to release, upon which they form precedent within the legal
system. It is crucial that such content, archived today, is the
same as that released in future; and regardless of length or
format no modification of the audio or visual streams should
be possible. Yet since the first digital video standard, H.120,
was introduced in 1984, hundreds of coding standards (each
supported by various file formats) have been developed [2].
The original archival video, therefore, will unlikely be the
same as the one presented to the user. This renders bit-level
cryptographic hashes like SHA-256 [3] impractical in securing
the authenticity of video archives. This motivates content-
aware hashing of the audio-visual stream within the video.
We therefore propose two technical contributions:
1) Temporal Content Hashing. A novel DNN based temporal
content hash (TCH) that is trained to ignore transcoding
artifacts, but is capable of detecting tampers of a few seconds
duration within typical video clip lengths in the order of
minutes or hours. The hash is computed over both the audio
and the visual components of the video stream. We initially
proposed an earlier version of our TCH scheme using a
hybrid CNN-LSTM network in workshop paper [4]. In this
extended paper we build on this approach to propose HAAE –
a hierarchical LSTM architecture that also incorporates a novel
attention scheme. This model yields superior performance and
removing the need to produce several models for a single
stream. We also explore applications of our hierarchical at-
tention model to alternative recurrent networks beyond LSTM
and evaluate alternative CNN backbones.
2) Cross-archive Blockchain for Video Integrity We propose
the storage of TCHs within a permissioned proof-of-authority
blockchain maintained across multiple independent archives
participating in ARCHANGEL, enabling mutual assurance
of video integrity within their archives. Fine-grain temporal
sensitivity of the TCH is challenging given the requirement of
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hash compactness for scalable storage on the blockchain. We
therefore take a hybrid approach. The codec-invariant TCHs
computed by the model are stored compactly on-chain. The
model itself is stored off-chain alongside the source video
(i.e. within the archive), and hashed on-chain via SHA-256
to mitigate attack on the TCH computation.
We demonstrate the value of ARCHANGEL through a
trial international deployment across the national government
archives of the United Kingdom, United States of America,
Australia, Norway and Estonia. Collaboration between the
majority of partnering archives (‘50% attack’ [5]) would
be needed to rewrite the blockchain and so undermine its
integrity, which is unlikely between archives of independent
sovereign nations. This justifies our use of Blockchain, which
has not been previously combined with temporal content-
hashing to ensure video archive integrity.
II. RELATED WORK
Content-aware video hashing is a long-studied problem.
Classical approaches to visual hashing explored heuristics to
extract video feature representations including discrete cosine
transform [6], spectral descriptors [7], and robust temporal
matching of visual structure [8], [9], [10] for video near-
duplicate detection/retrieval. Sivic et al. [11], [12] used a
shallow learning approach based on sparse gradient-domain
features for object retrieval within videos.
The advent of deep learning delivered highly powerful
hashing algorithms. Convolutional neural networks (CNN)
were largely used to encode spatial content [13], [14], [15],
[16]. Gou et al. [13] used ResNet [17] to encode video and
even audio features. Xu et al. [14] proposed to aggregate
CNN frame features with VLAD encoding for event detection,
sacrificing temporal coherence as the whole. Liong et al. [15]
attempted to encode motion-based features via average pooling
of consecutive frame features, effectively modelling temporal
sequence as short as 10 frames while semantic features were
learned in a supervised manner. Alternatively, Kim et al.
[16] employed 3D CNN to model space-time features in an
end-to-end network for video recognition; however due to
high memory requirements their proposed network could only
model low resolution video sequences of up to 80x80x16.
To model long sequences more advanced networks that
exhibit temporal dynamic behaviour such as recurrent neural
networks (RNN) are often employed [18]. Time Delay Neu-
ral Networks (TDNN) based on Tapped Delay Line (TDL)
were applied in phoneme recognition and energy disaggre-
gation [19], [20], [21]. Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) was
employed in machine translation [22] while Long Short-term
Memory networks (LSTM) have been used extensively for
video retrieval in either supervised [23] or unsupervised man-
ner with binarization constraints [24]. Unsupervised LSTM are
also achievable with deep auto-encoders [25], [26], [27]. Other
works focus on renovating LSTM architectures, resulting in
stacked LSTM [24], hierarchical LSTM [27], bidirectional
LSTM [28] and multi-head LSTM [25]. These techniques
demonstrate impressive performance on specific tasks and
motivate the design of our HAAE.
Video tampering detection is an important topic for digital
archives but unfortunately largely unexplored in literature.
The emergence of high-realism video manipulation using deep
learning (‘deep fakes’ [29]) has renewed interest in deter-
mining the provenance of digital video. Existing approaches
often focus on specific types of tampering e.g. frame inser-
tion/deletion/duplication [30] or copy-paste forgery [31], [32]
by analyzing low level patterns such as Fourier transform
signals or noise distribution. These techniques often work
with strict assumptions of camera settings, lighting condi-
tions, motion/background dynamics, and even video length
and codecs [33]. Very few deep learning approaches were
proposed for tampering detection, using either 3D CNN [34]
or RNN [35], [36], [37] but having the same limitations
regarding video length and task-specific. Other different but
related topics include anomaly/outlier detection [38], [39] and
novelty detection/one-class classification [40] that involves
learning space-time visual cues within videos tailored for the
corresponding tasks.
All above approaches mostly focus on the task of detecting
visual manipulation or abnormality, rather than immutable
storage of video hashes over longitudinal time periods, as
discussed in this paper. Our work does not tackle the task of
detecting video manipulation ab initio (we trust video at the
point of ingestion). Rather, our approach can detect subsequent
tampering with a video, offering a promising tool to verify
video integrity via proof of content provenance. Moreover,
existing techniques train a global model for content hashing
over a representative video corpus, and focus on hashing
short clips with lengths of a few minutes at most using
visual cues only. Audio-visual video fingerprinting via multi-
modal analysis is sparsely researched with prior work focusing
upon augmenting visual matching with an independent audio
fingerprinting step [41], predominantly via wavelet analysis
[42], [43]. Our archival context requires hashing of diverse
video content; training a single representative DNN to hash
such videos is unlikely practical nor future-proof. Rather our
work takes an unsupervised approach, fitting a HAAE network
model to a single video to minimise frame reconstruction and
prediction error. This has the advantage of being able to detect
short duration tampering within long duration video sequences
(but at the overhead of storing a model per hashed video).
Since videos in our archival context may contain limited visual
variation (e.g. a committee or court hearing) we hash both
video and audio modalities. Uniquely, we expose the model
to variations in video compression during training to avoid
detecting transcoding artifacts as false positives.
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) has existed for
over a decade - notably as blockchain, the technology that
underpins Bitcoin [44]. The unique capability of DLT is to
guarantee the integrity and provenance of data when dis-
tributed across many parties, without requiring those parties
to trust one another nor a central authority [5]; e.g. Bitcoin
securely tracks currency ownership without relying upon a
bank. Yet, the guarantees offered by DLT for distributed,
tamper-proof data have potential beyond the financial domain
[45], [46]. We build upon recent work suggesting the potential
of DLT for digital record-keeping [47], [48], notably an earlier
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Fig. 1. Our HAAE network for video tamper detection. (Top) this schematic is for visual cues, using InceptionResNetV2 backbone (fC ) to encode video
frames (audio network uses MFCC features instead). Once extracted, features are passed through the RNN encoder-decoder network where codec-invariant
features are learnt via a set of loss functions. (Bottom) Hierarchical layout of the encoder (fR) and decoder RNNs. Each layer of fR comprises a bidirectional
LSTM module followed by an attention module. The attention module is omitted in the decoder part. Bottleneck zt serves as the content hash and is compressed
via PQ post-process (not shown).
incarnation of ARCHANGEL described in Collomosse et al.
[47], [4] which utilised a proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain to
store SHA-256 hashes of binary zip files containing academic
research data. Also related, is the prior work of Gipp et al.
[49] where SHA-256 hashes specifically of video are stored
in a PoW (Bitcoin) blockchain for evidencing car collision
incidents. Our framework differs, due to the insufficiency of
such binary hashes [3] to verify the immutability of video
content in the presence of format shifting, which in turn
demands novel content-aware video hashing, and a hybrid on-
and off-chain storage strategy for safeguarding those hashes
(and DNN models generating them).
III. METHODOLOGY
We propose a content hashing framework for integrity
assurance of archival videos within several National Archives.
Our framework accepts a digital video of arbitrary length as
input and outputs at max two sets of compactly codec-invariant
hashes, one for the video stream and the another for audio
(if the audio stream is also available). The hashes (which
we from now refer as temporal content hashes, TCH) encode
spatio-temporal video features and can be used to detect even
minor spatial (frames) corruption or temporal discontinuities
(truncation, splices).
The core of our TCH framework is a novel self-supervised
recurrent neural networks (RNN) which is trained such that
reformatted (transcoded) videos produce near-identical TCHs
after a feed forward pass through the models, yet a tampered
video results in a different TCH. Note that we do not train a
single model to encode all videos, but instead fit a video-
specific model to content. This approach is advantageous
because (i) a well-performing model can be trained for an
extremely-long or highly static video and (ii) zero assumptions
on what constitutes the representative content of an archive
i.e. each video is the training data of its own model. A
disadvantage of this approach is that the model must be stored
alongside the video as meta-data in the archive. This measure
is necessary to prevent attacks on the TCH verification process.
We describe the architecture of our TCH network in sub-
sec. III-A. Details of the hash extraction, compression and
tampering detection processes are discussed in subsec. III-B.
A. Hierarchical Attention Auto-Encoder (HAAE) Network
We propose a novel triplet convolutional-recurrent network
structure resembling an autoencoder (AE). Frame-level spatial
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features are extracted using a CNN network before being fed
into an AE network to encode its temporal coherence. Fig. 1
(top) illustrates the overall architecture for encoding visual
content (audio content is discussed in subsec. III-A5).
1) Spatial encoding: Given a continuous video clip X
of arbitrary length we sample keyframes at 10 frames per
second (fps). Keyframes are aggregated into T = |X |N blocks
where N = 150 − 600 frames depending on |X | (∼ 15-60
seconds, padded with empty frames if necessary in the final
block; see subsec. IV-B for more details), yielding a series
of sub-sequences X = {X1, X2, ..., XT } ∈ RN×H×W×C
where H, W and C are the height, width and number of
channels for each image frame (usually C=1 or 3 for gray
or color RGB frame). A CNN network encodes each block
Xt to a sequence of semantic features that summarize spatial
content. fC : RH×W×C → RS , which encodes X into
E = {Et ∈ RN×S | t = 1, 2, ..., T} with S being the
output dimension of the final fully connected (FC) layer.
Our proposed model uses off-the-shelf InceptionResNetV2
backbone [50] for fC (S = 1536). An ablation study about
CNN architectures is discussed in subsec. IV-C.
2) HAAE: We propose to model the temporal relationship
between consecutive frame features Et with an RNN, fR :
RN×S → RD, resulting in an embedding Z = {zt ∈ RD | t =
1, 2, ..., T}. Fig. 1 (bottom) illustrates the architecture of
fR which consists of 2 layers each having a Bi-directional
Long Short Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) module followed by
an attention module.
Denote eit the ith feature vector, i ∈ [1, N ], of the tth block
Et, t ∈ [1, T ]. A standard LSTM module takes in input vector
eit and previous state hi−1,t to output current state hit:
[ji, gi, ui, oi]
T =W eit +Uhi−1,t + b, (1)
ci = ci−1  σ(gi) + tanh(ui) σ(ji), (2)
hit ..= LSTM(eit) = σ(oi) tanh(ci). (3)
where ji, gi, ui, oi, ci are input gate, forget gate, candidate
activation, output gate and cell state at time step i re-
spectively; σ(.) is the sigmoid function and  indicates
the element-wise product; W = {Wj ,Wg,Wu,Wo},U =
{Uj , Ug, Uu, Uo}, b = {bj , bg, bu, bo} are sets of learnable
weight matrices and bias parameters for the corresponding
gates.
A Bi-LSTM module parses an input sequence Et =
{eit | i = 1, 2, ...N} in both forward and backward directions,
concatenating hidden states as outputs:
−→
h it =
−−−−→
LSTM(eit), i ∈ [1, N ] (4)
←−
h it =
←−−−−
LSTM(eit), i ∈ [N, 1] (5)
hit = [
−→
h it,
←−
h it]. (6)
This results in a 2x-dimensional output as compared with stan-
dard LSTM. However Bi-LSTM often outperforms standard
LSTM as it explores both past and future context concurrently.
In our experiments, we observe that enabling Bi-LSTM makes
the training more stable, especially on static videos where
changes in subsequent time steps are insignificant.
The Bi-LSTM outputs are weight-summed to a single
representation vector, zt, via an attention module. Specifically,
vit = tanh(Wahit + ba), (7)
αit =
ev
T
itva∑
i e
vTitva
, (8)
zt =
∑
i
αithit. (9)
That is, the input of the attention module, hit, is first projected
into a hidden embedding space via a FC layer, becoming vit.
The importance of vit is measured via its similarity with a
context vector, va, which is also learnable. We then normalise
this importance factor through a softmax function, resulting
in αit ∈ R. Finally, inputs hit | i = 1, ..., N are accumulated
with weights αit to produce output zt which is the bottleneck
(embedding) of our HAAE network.
Hierarchical LSTM: although there is no obvious hierar-
chical structure in video frames (unlike text having a clear
hierarchical order of characters, words, sentences and so on),
we find a hierarchical design of fR advantageous in modelling
long sequence. That is, assume N = p × q | p, q ∈ N+, we
split block Et into q sub-blocks, Et = {Eit ∈ Rp×S | i =
1, 2, ..., q} , then pass these sub-blocks into the first Bi-
LSTM/Attention layer. This results in q output vectors which
form the input sequence for the second Bi-LSTM/Attention
layer (see also Fig. 1, bottom):
rit = fR1(Eit), i ∈ [1, q], (10)
Rt = {rit | i = 1, 2, ..., q} ∈ Rq×S′ , (11)
zt = fR2(Rt) ∈ RD. (12)
where fR1, fR2 denotes the two Bi-LSTM/Attention layers
and S′ is the intermediate output dimension. Each layer of
fR now processes much shorter sequences thus can learn a
finer representation. We study the performance of our approach
versus one-layer RNN in subsec. IV-C.
Note that our design of fR is motivated from the work of
Yang et al. [51] however their network is for text classification
whereas fR is an encoder part of our larger HAAE network.
Additionally, our design differs from stacked LSTM [24] in
term of modularity – in our approach each sub-block Eit is
processed independently while in stacked LSTM the notation
of sub-block does not exist. Also our approach results in a
much smaller model as compared with stacked LSTM.
Decoder: our HAAE network has two decoders, gR and
gP , hierarchically mirror the encoder design. gR is designed
to reconstruct the input sequence Et while gP predicts the
next sequence Et+1. We omit the attention module in gR
and gP (since a decoder “expands” features while an attention
layer migrates them). For gR, we bridge the outputs of each
layer in the encoder (just before the attention module) to
the corresponding layer of the decoder, effectively resembling
a U-Net structure [52]. We use ‘average’ bridge instead
of concatenation as in [52] and find this equally effective
but resulting in a smaller network. For gP , bridging is not
necessary and so does the bidirectional LSTM. Therefore we
use hierarchical standard LSTM to model this branch.
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Specifically, for the reconstruction decoder gR:
z′t =W
′zt + b′, (13)
rR2it =
1
2
(z′t + h
E2
it ), (14)
hR1it = BiLSTM(r
R2
it ), (15)
rR1it =
1
2
(hR1it + h
E1
it ), (16)
e˜it = BiLSTM(r
R1
it ). (17)
where hEj and hRj are output hidden states of the Bi-LSTM
layer j of the encoder and reconstruction decoder respectively
(we slightly abuse the notation of eqn. 6 here). Similarly, for
the prediction decoder gP :
z′′t =W
′′zt + b′′, (18)
hP2it = BiLSTM(z
′′
t ), (19)
e˜i,t+1 = BiLSTM(h
P2
it ), (20)
3) Time Delay Neural Network (TDNN): Our HAAE net-
work uses LSTM as the core temporal processing unit, how-
ever any other sequence modelling architectures could be
employed. In this work we also investigate TDNN [19], [21] as
a LSTM alternative. Unlike LSTM which uses memory state
to model long term dependencies, a TDNN cell instead loops
back the output directly as one of its inputs for the next time
step. To handle short-term dependency TDNN uses a set of
convolution filters spanning across a time window k. Under
TDNN, eqn. 3 becomes:
hit ..= TDNN(eit) = σ([eit, hi−1,t]W + b). (21)
where eit = [ei−k/2,t, ...eit, ...ei+k/2,t]. That is, the output at
a certain time step is pulled from k neighbouring inputs. Since
our time window is symmetrical (±k/2) the bidirectional
setting is no longer necessary. TDNN does not have memory
state like LSTM and relies solely on convolutions thus is much
faster.
4) Losses: Training our HAAE network is governed by
three equally-contributed losses, minimising the overall ob-
jective function:
M(X ) = argmin
θE ,θR,θP
LR(Xt; θE , θR)+
+ LP (Xt, Xt+1; θE , θP ) + LT (Xt; θE). (22)
where θE , θR, θP are the weight parameters of the encoder fR
and the two decoders gR and gP .
Reconstruction loss, LR, aims to reconstruct input sequence
Eˆt from zt that approximates Et. This loss is measured using
Mean Square Error (MSE), effectively makes the network an
auto-encoder as in [26].
LR(Xt) = 1
2
|fC(Xt)− gR(fR(fC(Xt)))|22
=
1
2
|Et − Eˆt|22. (23)
Prediction loss, LP , aims to predict the next sequence Eˆt+1
from zt that approximates Et+1 via MSE. While the recon-
struction loss ensures the integrity within sequences, the pre-
diction loss provides inter-sequence links which is important
for encoding very long videos. For the final sequence t = T ,
this loss term is simply turned off. This work is similar to [16]
however they used 3D CNN for spatio-temporal encoding
instead of HAAE in our work.
LP (Xt, Xt+1) = 1
2
|fC(Xt+1)− gP (fR(fC(Xt)))|22
=
1
2
|Et+1 − Eˆt+1|22. (24)
Triplet loss, LT , brings together similar sequences (za, zp)
while pushing dissimilar sequences (za, zn) such that their
difference is below a certain margin:
LT = 1|T |
∑
(za,zp,zn)∈T
{d(za, zn)− d(za, zp) +m}+ (25)
where d(.) is the cosine similarity metric and {.}+ is the hinge
loss function. Here we desire the embedding Z invariant to
changes in video formats (e.g. codec, container, compression
quality) hence the positive sample, Xpt , is set to be the same
video sequence as the original sequence Xt but transcoded
differently zp = fR(fC(X
p
t )). To generate X
p
t we augment X
using various transcoding combinations (details are described
in subsec. sections IV-A and IV-B), resulting in a much
larger training set XP that also helps to reduce overfitting.
To make the learning harder, the negative sample is selected
among other sequences having the same encoding format as
the anchor zn = fR(fC(Xnt∗)), X
n
t∗ ∈ X\Xt. Additionally,
in archiving practice it is more desirable to reduce the false
negative rate than the false positive, thus we also create
negative samples by randomly removing several frames from
the anchor (and pad with frames from the next block Xt+1 in
order to maintain the sequence length).
The margin m is fixed m = 0.2 in our experiments. The
network is trained end-to-end via the Stochastic Gradient
Descent optimizer (SGD with momentum, decay learning rate
and early stopping following [53]) with InceptionResNetV2
initially pre-trained over the ImageNet corpus [50].
5) Encoding audio content: We propose a similar HAAE
network to encode audio, replacing the CNN encoder function
fC with MFCC co-efficients from the audio track of each
block Xt. MFCC [54] is chosen because it closely approx-
imates human vocal system’s response, which is arguably
important in archiving. We later demonstrate that encoding
audio is critical in the cases where video contains mostly static
scenes e.g. a video account of a meeting or court proceedings.
The HAAE bottleneck for audio features is 128-D; we denote
this embedding z′t.
B. Video Hashing, Compression and Tampering Detection
Given a video X , the representation zt of sub-sequence Xt
where t = [0, T ] can be obtained by passing Xt through the
encoder fR(fC(.)). Additionally, for each scene we define a
threshold value set to tolerate variation due to video transcod-
ing:
t = max
zpt ∈Zpt
||zt − zpt ||2 (26)
where Zpt is the collection of bottleneck representations of the
positive clips (i.e. transcoded) Xpt used to form the training
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Fig. 2. Representative thumbnails of the long-duration video datasets used
in our evaluation. Top: ASSAVID, uneditted ‘rushes’ footage from the BBC
archives of the 1992 Olympics; Middle: OLYMPICS, editted footage from
Youtube of the 2012-2016 Olympics; Bottom: TNA, Court hearings — mostly
static visuals.
TABLE I
DATASET STATISTICS.
Datasets VideoNo.
Total length
(hh:mm:ss) Min/Max/Avg Format
ASSAVID [56] 21 01:29:11 12s/39m/4m mpg, mpeg
TNA 7 06:23:54 4m/2h/54m mp4, flv
OLYMPICS 5 00:48:43 8m/13m/9m mp4
triplets. t should tolerate any video transcoding in future with
assumption that future codecs are likely to encoder with higher
fidelity than existing methods. The same method is applied to
process audio.
The collective representations of all blocks that forms X ,
along with other meta info such as threshold t and clip IDs
are stored securely in blockchain as the content hash of video
X (more details in subsec. V). As X can have an arbitrary
length, its content hash could exceed the current blockchain
transaction limit. To address this problem, we further compress
Z into 256-bit binary using Product Quantisation (PQ) [55].
PQ requires the training of a further model (referred to here as
‘PQ Encoder’) capable of compressing Z ∈ R256 to ζ ∈ B256
and estimating the L2 norm between pairs of such feature
representations.
At verification time, we determine the integrity of a query
video X∗ by feeding forward each of its blocks through the
video and audio models trained for X , to obtain its TCHs.
These hashes of X ∗ are compared against the corresponding
hashes of X stored within the blockchain. X ∗ is considered
tampered if there exists a pair of hashes whose distance
greater than the corresponding threshold (t). This method is
advantageous as it provides a localised indication of which
block within the video experienced tampering.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We describe the datasets used as the benchmarks for our
experiments in subsec. IV-A and details of our model settings
and training procedure in subsec. IV-B. We then present
our ablation studies in subsec. IV-C, the tampering detection
results in subsec. IV-D and time complexity in subsec. IV-E.
A. Datasets
In archiving practice, digital videos can be of any topic
and arbitrary length – a typical video record of an event
can last several hours. Moreover, due to its saving-for-future
purpose and the diversity in archiving methodology of different
archive states, there is no standard encoding format for these
videos. In contrast, most video datasets in the literature are few
seconds to several minutes in length and of relatively narrow
domain. In this work we evaluate with 3 diverse datasets more
representative of an archival context as follows:
ASSAVID [56] are unedited television broadcast videos taken
from Barcelona Olympics of 1992. This dataset covers various
sports with commentary in the audio track. Videos are encoded
using the dated MPEG-2 video and MP2 audio codecs.
OLYMPICS are edited fast-moving Youtube videos taken
from Olympics 2012-2016 covering final rounds of compe-
titions in 5 different sports including running, swimming,
skating and springboard. The dataset has modern high quality
MPEG-4 encoding but often contains fast motions and loud
background noise and/or music.
TNA are court-hearing videos released by the United Kingdom
National Archives. These videos are encoded using either
Sorenson H.263/MP3 or H.264/AAC. This dataset is partic-
ularly challenging as the videos contains highly static scenes
of courtroom but salient audio track, also several of them last
hours. Examples of these datasets are shown in Fig. 2 and its
statistics are summarised in Tab. I.
For each video within the three datasets above, we create
three test sets: a ‘control’ set, a ‘temporal tamper’ set and
a ‘spatial tamper’ set. The ‘control’ test set contains 10 re-
formatted versions of each of the original videos. Specifically,
we use the modern video codec H.265 with random frame
rate (26/48/60 fps), 12 levels of compression and containers
(.mp4, .mkv) to transcode the videos. Audio is also transcoded
to a new codec (libmp3lame, aac) with random sampling
rate and compression quality. The transcoding is implemented
using the open-source ffmpeg library. In the worst scenario
the transcoded video could be 8 times smaller in file size than
the original video. The ‘temporal tamper’ test set contains
100 videos generated from each original video by randomly
removing a chunk of 1-10 seconds while keeping the same
encoding formats. Similarly, the ‘spatial tamper’ test set con-
tains 100 videos where frames/audio within random sections
of the video (1-10 seconds in length) are replaced by white
noise.
B. Training Procedure
Given video clip X we train two HAAEs independently
yielding a pair of models (M,M ′) for the video and audio
modalities. We employed InceptionResnetV2 [50] (S=1536) as
the final CNN architecture for fC (we further discuss this in
subsec. IV-C1) and using the embedding provided by the final
fully connected/pooling layer as the output to E. To minimise
model size we freeze fC and only train {fR, gR, gP }. Input
frames are resized to fit the CNN input size i.e. 299x299 for
InceptionResNetV2. Input audio is first converted to a mono
stream (when necessary) and normalised prior to which MFCC
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Fig. 3. Details of the encoder and decoders’ layers in our HAAE-LSTM
network encoding video content. The CNN architecture (omitted in this figure)
is InceptionResNetV2 thus Et has feature dimension S = 1536.
TABLE II
SEQUENCE LENGTH BREAKDOWN IN HAAE. N : LENGTH OF THE INPUT
SEQUENCE TO THE HAAE NETWORK, WHICH IS SPLIT INTO q
SUB-BLOCKS OF LENGTH p EACH (N = p× q) TO BE PROCESSED
HIERARCHICALLY – C.F. FIG. 1.
Video length
(minutes)
Block size
(N)
Layer 1 seq. len.
(p)
Layer 2 seq. len.
(q)
(0, 2] 150 15 10
(2, 15] 300 20 15
(15, ∞) 600 40 15
features are extracted (S=26). For video content, the HAAE
encoder fR has 256 and 128 LSTM cells in its two layers
while the decoders gR and gP are configured according to the
encoder settings and the feature dimension of the input (see
Fig. 3). Note that the prediction decoder gP has 2x number of
LSTM cells compared with the reconstruction decoder gR to
compensate for the lack of bridging and LSTM bidirectional
parsing. The block length (N ) and sequence length for the
two hierarchical layers (p, q) are set according to Tab. II.
We set the block size small for short videos to encourage
coherence learning between subsequent chunks and maintain
sufficient training data (small block size means more blocks
available for training). Discussion of these settings are reported
in subsec. IV-C4.
For audio content the number of LSTM cells halve to model
the much more compact MFCC features. The dimension of the
embedding vector z is empirically set to 256-D for video and
128-D for audio prior to PQ. Once the model has been trained
we save the encoder part of the network only; the off-chain
storage required to verify a video is approximately 50Mb total
for audio and video models.
Data augmentation in the form of video reformatting, is used
to enrich the training data and form the triplets to develop
codec invariance (eqn. 25). For each video we created 50
different transcoded versions using current or older codecs
(e.g. H.264, H.263p, VP8, ...) at a variety of frame rates
from 20fps to 30fps and with a variety of compression/quality
TABLE III
EVALUATING VISUAL TAMPER DETECTION PERFORMANCE FOR VARIOUS
CNN ARCHITECTURES. VALUES EXPRESSED ARE ACCURACY RATES FOR
spatial AND temporal TAMPER DETECTION, AND TRUE NEGATIVE RATES
FOR control AVERAGED ACROSS THE ABLATION TEST SET. HIGHER IS
BETTER.
Architecture Params(M)
Speed
(ms) Temporal Spatial Control
NASNet [57] 4.3 35.7 0.833 0.696 0.873
MobileNetV2 [58] 2.3 10.5 0.849 0.697 0.864
DenseNet [59] 7.0 24.2 0.852 0.699 0.973
VGG-16 [60] 134.3 11.2 0.876 0.753 0.909
ResNet50 [17] 23.6 15.6 0.856 0.747 0.913
Incep.ResNetV2 [50] 54.3 46.7 0.898 0.809 0.955
parameters spanning typical high and low values for each
codec. The transcoder used was ffmpeg with compression
factor ‘crf’ an integer number reflecting presets for the codecs
provided with that library. Note that these codec sets differ
from those natively used in the test set. These transcoded
examples form the positive exemplars for the triplet network
(subsec. III-A4). The negative exemplars are sampled from
the two following sources at equal probabilities: (i) a block
semantically different from the anchor and (ii) the anchor
block with maximum 5% frames removed or replaced by noise
that simulates a tampering attack.
We conducted our experiments using the Python deep-
learning library Tensorflow on a machine with 200GB RAM,
Intel Xeon 6140 (max 6 cores per job) and a 16GB Quadro
GTX 5000 GPU.
C. Ablation Studies
We implemented ablation studies for different encoder back-
bones, choice of loss functions, hyper-parameter tuning and
various elements in our HAAE design. We sampled 12 videos
from all datasets above to create a single ablation test set.
All experiments below are tested against this test set unless
otherwise stated.
1) CNN architecture: We tested 6 architectures for the
CNN encoder part, including 3 large models and 3 com-
pact ones. The large models are 16-layer VGG [60]
(S=1024), 50-layer ResNet [17] (S=2048) and Inception-
ResnetV2 [50] (S=1536). The compact models include Mo-
bileNetV2 (S=1280), the mobile version of NASNet (S=1056)
and the smallest version of DenseNet (aka. DenseNet-121,
S=1024). For simplicity and without loss of generalization we
use an 1-layer LSTM design for fR, gR, gP . When varying
the CNN backbone all other parts of the network are kept
the same. Table. III shows the tamper detection accuracy on
the temporal and spatial tamper sets, as well as the true
negative rate for the control sets. The model size (total number
of parameters excluding the last FC classification layer) and
feature extraction speed (measured in ms per frame) are also
reported. The overall performance of these models mostly
reflect their classification scores on ImageNet. An exception is
VGG16 which surprisingly outperforms the 3 compact models.
VGG16 is also the runner-up in term of inference speed despite
being the largest one (because it creates less intermediate
feature-maps during inference). MobileNetV2 enjoys being
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(a) Temporal (b) Spatial (c) Control
Fig. 4. Evaluation of HAAE-LSTM (top) and HAAE-TDNN (bottom) on the temporal (a), spatial (b) and control (c) test sets of the three datasets listed in
subsec. IV-A.
the most compact and fastest model although sub-optimal
accuracy. DenseNet has the most compact output (S=1024)
and outperforms the rest on the control set, although its rela-
tively low performance on the tamper sets might indicate the
model struggles to fit on data. Overall, the InceptionResNetV2
architecture shows consistent performance on all test sets. It
achieves the best scores on the temporal and spatial sets (2%
and 5% better than the closest competitors respectively) and
second-best on the control set. InceptionResNetV2 is therefore
selected as the final CNN backbone in our HAAE design for
the next experiments.
2) Losses: We perform ablations on the three terms com-
prising total loss (eqn. 22) while keeping the network, data
and training parameters unchanged. The following baselines
are brought to comparison:
• AE [26] – a standard autoencoder with only the recon-
struction loss LR being enabled.
• AE+P [16] – an autoencoder with a prediction branch.
LR and LP are enabled.
• Triplet AE+P [4] – a fully shared triplet network where
each of the anchor/positive/negative branches is an au-
toencoder with a prediction decoder as a tendril. All loss
terms in eqn. 22 are enabled.
The contribution of each loss to tamper-detection capability
is reflected in Table. IV. The reconstruction loss alone (i.e.
the AE model) has the best score on the control set since its
sole objective is to reconstruct the input sequences. The lack
of learning coherence between adjacent sequences causes it to
under-perform detection on both tamper sets. In contrast, the
prediction loss (AE+P) helps to learn an embedding more sen-
sitive to tampering and the triplet loss (Triplet AE+P) balances
the performance on all three test sets. This demonstrates the
importance of the three loss terms of eqn. 22 in the detection
of tampered videos.
3) HAAE: We experimented with different designs of our
HAAE architecture by disabling one or more of its features
TABLE IV
ABLATION EXPERIMENT EXPLORING TERM INFLUENCE ON TOTAL LOSS
(EQN. 22): LR (RECONSTRUCTION), LP (PREDICTION) AND LT
(TRIPLET). SOLID DOT INDICATES INCORPORATION OF LOSS TERM.
VALUES EXPRESSED ARE ACCURACY RATES FOR spatial AND temporal
TAMPER DETECTION, AND TRUE NEGATIVE RATES FOR control AVERAGED
ACROSS THE ABLATION TEST SET. HIGHER IS BETTER.
Method LR LP LT Temporal Spatial Control
AE [26] • 0.884 0.749 0.968
AE+P [16] • • 0.896 0.776 0.945
Triplet AE+P [4] • • • 0.898 0.809 0.955
TABLE V
ABLATION EXPERIMENTS FOR DIFFERENT HAAE SETTINGS. VALUES
EXPRESSED ARE ACCURACY RATES FOR spatial AND temporal TAMPER
DETECTION, AND TRUE NEGATIVE RATES FOR control AVERAGED ACROSS
THE ABLATION TEST SET. HIGHER IS BETTER.
Architecture Temporal Spatial Control
GRU [22] 0.825 0.690 0.945
SimpleRNN 0.900 0.793 0.927
LSTM
Stacked LSTM [24] 0.842 0.787 0.891
1-layer LSTM/woT [4] 0.898 0.809 0.955
HAE-LSTM/woT 0.956 1.00 0.954
HAAE-LSTM/woT 0.960 0.999 0.965
HAAE-LSTM (final) 0.988 1.00 0.964
TDNN
HAE-TDNN/stride [20] 0.838 0.767 0.920
HAAE-TDNN/woT 0.981 1.00 0.963
HAAE-TDNN (final) 1.00 1.00 0.963
as well as changing the core layers. The following algorithms
are brought to comparison:
• SimpleRNN – a simple RNN using only FC layers where
the output is to be fed back to input. SimpleRNN is
similar to TDNN in the sense that it does not hold any
memory state however SimpleRNN does not have the
notation of time window like TDNN.
• Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [22] – stores both long
and short term memory in a single hidden state. GRU is
a less complex but faster version of LSTM.
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• Stacked LSTM [24] – a 2-layer LSTM network where
outputs of every time steps in the first layer are the
corresponding inputs for the next layers.
• 1-layer LSTM/woT [4] – the same Triplet AE+P model
reported in Tab. IV, consisting just a single layer LSTM
with all loss terms functioning. Note the notation woT
indicates ‘without tampering data’ seen by the model
during training.
• HAAE-LSTM – the proposed approach described in
subsec. III-A. We also experimented with 2 more vari-
ants. First, HAE-LSTM/woT is the hierarchical network
without attention module. Second, HAAE-LSTM/woT
is the proposed approach without tampering data seen
during the training.
• HAAE-TDNN – the same HAAE network with TDNN
replacing LSTM. We tested 3 variants of this approach.
The full version and HAAE-TDNN/woT mirror the
HAAE-LSTM configurations above. The 3rd configura-
tion, HAE-TDNN/stride is inspired from [20] where con-
volution stride is employed to compress sequence length
between layers instead of using attention mechanism.
The results are depicted in Tab. V. We made four observations.
First, LSTM and TDNN based approaches are generally better
than GRU and SimpleRNN. Second, the hierarchical structure
contributes significantly to the performance gain, as in the
case of HAE-LSTM versus 1-layer LSTM. This indicates
the benefits of modelling short sub-sequences within a long
sequence in a hierarchical order even if such order may not
exist in the data. Third, integrating the attention mechanism
also benefits the performance significantly, as in HAAE-
LSTM versus HAE-LSTM and especially HAAE-TDNN ver-
sus HAE-TDNN/stride. Finally, the tamper detection accuracy
could be improved further by supplying synthesised tamper
data as negative exemplars to the model during training.
Since the TDNN-based approaches have demonstrated im-
pressive performance on the ablation tests we decided to
evaluate it further on the full datasets in subsec. IV-D, along
with LSTM-based HAAE.
4) Tuning hyper-parameters: Selecting the right values of
hyper-parameters is an important task. During model training
we employed adaptive learning rate (specifically, the learning
rate is step-decayed if the loss does not improve) and early
stopping (if the learning rate reaches its minimum and the
loss still does not improve after certain epochs the training
is stopped), hence the learning rate and number of epochs
are exempted from hyper-parameter tuning. Other important
parameters in HAAE include number of LSTM cells in each
layer and the layer’s sequence length (denoted as p and q
in subsec. III-A). Inspired from the work of [61], [62] , we
employed a Bayesian Optimization method based on Gaussian
Process to find optimal values of these parameters1. Fig. 5
shows the tuning results on the video and audio streams
of a sample video. Having much smaller feature dimension,
the tuning of the audio data often stops after less than 10
Bayes iterations while the video stream took much longer.
Also we observed that the optimal values vary greatly across
1This method is implemented in the open-source GPyOpt Python library.
Fig. 5. Tuning hyper-parameters of HAAE using Bayes optimization on a
sample video. Optimal values are shown in the table below. The objective
function is validation loss, which is the averaged total loss over a transcoded
video set aside from training.
different videos. Since a separate HAAE model is trained for
each video we could ideally run Bayesian Optimization on
every training. However this is a time-consuming process and
quickly becomes impractical on long videos. We therefore opt
to a fixed hyper-param setting as described in subsec. IV-B
and Tab. II, which is the closest to our observations of the
optimal values on the ablation set.
D. Tamper Detection
We evaluated the performance of tamper detection on all
3 full datasets for a variety of tamper lengths. Fig. 4 (a-
b) shows the trend of tamper length to detection accuracy
for the proposed system and also on an ablated version
of the system reliant solely on audio and solely on video
modalities. Both temporal and spatial tamper sets have a
similar trend: models are consistently effective at detecting
tampered segments of around 2 seconds or more. This is
excellent sensitivity given the total length of the individual
videos (c.f. Tab. I). The TNA and ASSAVID datasets have
the most clear audio thus achieves great audio scores on both
test sets. In contrast, the lowest audio score is reported on
the OLYMPICS dataset which contains mostly music (sub-
optimal for MFCC) or loud background noise. Both the TNA
and OLYMPICS have high visual quality that leads to well
performant video models. It also demonstrates the robustness
of our approach against video motion – whether the videos
are static like the TNA or contain fast-moving objects like
the OLYMPICS. On the other hand, low visual quality and
older codecs degrade the performance on the ASSAVID’s
video streams. Fig. 6 illustrates that the decay in image quality
during video transcoding and compression on the ASSAVID
is more severe than the other two datasets. This results in a
more scatter embedding for those transcoded data thus larger
tampering threshold (eqn. 26). Consequently the ASSAVID
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ASSAVID
OLYMPICS
TNA
Fig. 6. Artefacts on video frames after transcoding and compression using ffmpeg. Note the compression ratio is controlled via the crf parameter (higher
crf value means more compression, smaller footprint but lower quality). Having videos encoded with an old codec, the ASSAVID dataset experiences the
heaviest degradation in image quality.
models become less sensitive to tampering, especially with
short tamper duration.
Fig. 4 (a-b) also demonstrates the benefits of modelling both
video and audio modalities together. As with the OLYMPICS
dataset, a perfect tamper detection score is achieved thanks
to the video model compensating the difficult audio model.
For ASSAVID, the two modality models compliment each
other to deliver a significant performance boost on both
tampering test sets. Additionally, the TDNN-based approach
(bottom row) demonstrates better performance than LSTM
(top row). The LSTM-based approach has comparable per-
formance when aggregating results from both audio and video
streams. Furthermore, HAAE-LSTM has better performance
on the control set, as shown in Fig. 4 (c). Here the true negative
detection rate is plotted against the compression factor of the
transcoded videos. In overall, accuracy is consistently high
for video downgrade, with no observable trend that severely
compressed videos are incorrectly flagged as tampered. This is
the results of data augmentation during training – the models
are trained to be robust against downgrade in audio-visual
quality (subsec. III-A4 and IV-A). The tampering detection
accuracy on the audio stream remains high except for the
OLYMPICS dataset which starts dropping at q = 8. This is
understandable considering the noisy audio signal present in
the OLYMPICS set. The performance on OLYMPICS-A could
be improved further by filtering noise out of the audio signal
and retaining only human speech as a pre-processing step but
it is beyond the scope of this work.
We note the low performance of HAAE-TDNN compared
with HAAE-LSTM on the TNA set in Fig. 4 (c). We hy-
potheses that TDNN struggles to model large amount of data,
as the TNA set contains mostly long videos (c.f. Tab. I).
To confirm this hypothesis we plot the performance statistics
across all datasets grouping videos by length (Fig. 7). While
the performance on the two tamper test sets is shown not
affected by video length, the detection rate on the control
set i.e. the ability of the system to reflect true negatives
(avoid false detections) gradually decreases, with faster drop
for the TDNN-based approach. The standard deviation in
measurement on the control set (illustrated by the whiskers
on top of the accuracy bars in Fig. 7) also increases, which
is the result of our system outputting binary decisions. The
drop in performance on the control set can be explained in
2 ways. First, for extremely long videos there is a greater
chance that two duplicated or near duplicated frame blocks
exist, particularly from highly static events recorded from
stationary cameras such as the court hearing events in the TNA
dataset. Second, it is statistically justifiable – an hour-length
video consists of many frame blocks in which one failing
block will label the whole video as tampered. Nevertheless,
approximately 10% of the videos have length greater than
1 hour, yet for HAAE-LSTM 90% of the control set are
detected correctly and more importantly the tamper videos are
all successfully detected. HAAE-LSTM is also shown more
robust in modelling long videos compared with HAAE-TDNN.
Table. VI summarises the performance of our tamper de-
tection system in term of Precision (positive predictive value),
Recall (sensitivity), False Detection Rate (FDR), overall Ac-
curacy (ACC) and F1 score (after [63]). Similar to our ob-
servation in Fig. 4 the ASSAVID dataset with dated MPEG-
2 codec and low video quality results in large tampering
threshold t (eqn. 26) thus less sensitive to tampering. The
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Fig. 7. Overall accuracy vs. video length averages across all three test sets
for HAAE-LSTM and HAAE-TDNN. Values expressed are accuracy rates
for spatial and temporal tamper detection, and true negative rates for control
averaged across all test sets partitioned by length.
TABLE VI
OVERALL TAMPER DETECTION PERFORMANCE OF THE 3 DATASETS IN
TERM OF PRECISION (P), RECALL (R), FALSE DETECTION RATE (FDR),
ACCURACY (ACC) AND F1 SCORE. HERE, A TRUE POSITIVE DENOTES A
TAMPERED VIDEO BEING CORRECTLY DETECTED AS TAMPERED. HIGHER
IS BETTER FOR P/R/FDR/F1. LOWER IS BETTER FOR FDR.
Methods Datasets P R FDR ACC F1
HAAE-
LSTM
ASSAVID 1.00 0.9733 0.00 0.9746 0.9865
OlYMPICS 0.9960 1.00 0.0040 0.9962 0.9980
TNA 0.9964 1.00 0.0036 0.9966 0.9982
HAAE-
TDNN
ASSAVID 0.9979 1.00 0.0021 0.9980 0.9989
OlYMPICS 0.9960 1.00 0.0040 0.9962 0.9980
TNA 0.9894 1.00 0.0106 0.9898 0.9947
more modern MPEG-4 encoded OLYMPICS dataset has a
better balance between precision and recall with near-perfect
overall performance. The HAAE-TDNN is efficient on the
short ASSAVID videos but the HAAE-LSTM proves more
robust on the longer TNA set.
E. Time complexity
We report the time complexity of the training and test
phases for our proposed HAAE-LSTM and HAAE-TDNN
approaches. Fig. 8 (top) illustrates the time spent at different
training stages. A typical training time on a 3-minute video
is 2 hours. For a 90 minute video it takes 27.5 hours in
total for HAAE-LSTM and 23 hours for HAAE-TDNN. The
most time consuming train step - CNN feature extraction -
accounts for ∼ 75% of total training time. Note that this time
is mainly spent on decoding and parsing video frames rather
than the actual CNN model inference, although this could be
improved with more multiprocessing resources. Training the
HAAE model is also time-consuming with more time spent
on the LSTM-based approach. Fig. 8 (bottom) compares the
time efficiency of HAAE-LSTM and HAAE-TDNN in training
(excluding all common train steps) and test. HAAE-TDNN
is much faster than HAAE-LSTM at training although the
difference at test time is negligible. Fig. 8 (bottom) also shows
the linear relationship between train/test time and video length
(note: the time plots indicates exponential curves but the video-
length axis is in logarithmic scale).
Fig. 8. Time complexity of our TCH system versus video length. (Top) time
taken at different train steps. Note: HAAE-LSTM and HAAE-TDNN have
identical augmentation and CNN feature extraction steps. (Bottom) Speed
gain when replacing LSTM layers in HAAE with TDNN.
V. ARCHANGEL: SAFEGUARDING DIGITAL ARCHIVES
WITH AI AND BLOCKCHAIN
We present ARCHANGEL – a proof-of-authority (PoA,
permissioned) blockchain service as a mechanism for assuring
provenance of digital video stored off-chain, within the public
National Archives of several nation states. In this section we
describe the ARCHANGEL architecture in subsec. V-A, the
statistic of our trial studies in subsec. V-B and the current
limitations in subsec. V-C.
A. The ARCHANGEL System
The core architecture of ARCHANGEL is a DLT net-
work implemented via Ethereum [64] and maintained by the
independently participating archives, each of which runs a
sealer node in order to provide consensus by majority on
data stored on-chain. Fig. 9 illustrates the architecture of
the system. ARCHANGEL is implemented on a compute
infrastructure run locally at each participating archive. The
system has been designed with archival practices in mind,
utilising data packages conforming to the Open Archival
Information System (OAIS) [65], and as such the archivist
user must provide metadata for an archive data package named
Submission Information Package (SIP) that the video files
are part of. A web-app run locally inspects each SIP as it
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Fig. 9. ARCHANGEL Architecture. Multiple archives maintain a PoA
blockchain (yellow) storing hash data that can verify the integrity of video
records (video files and their metadata; sub-sec. V) held off-chain, within
the archives (blue). Universal unique identifiers (UUID) link on- and off-
chain data. Two kinds of hash data are held on-chain: 1) A temporal content
hash (TCH) protecting the audio-visual content from tampering, computed by
passing sub-sequences of the video through a deep neural network (DNN)
model to yield a sequences of short binary (PQ [55]) codes (green); 2) A
binary hash (SHA-256) of the DNNs and PQ encoders that guards against
tampering with the TCH computation (red).
Fig. 10. Schematic of TCH Computation. Videos are split into blocks which
are each independently hashed to a TCH. The TCH is the concatenation of PQ
codes that are derived from RNN bottleneck features (zt). Each code hashes
a block of N frames. Encoding pipeline shown for visual cues only; audio is
similarly encoded.
is submitted, where it is verified to be a suitable file type, and
stored within the locally held archive (database) for processing
by a background daemon. The daemon trains the video/audio
model pair and the PQ encoder on a secure high performance
compute (HPC) cluster with nodes comprising four NVidia
1080Ti GPU cards. The time taken to train the model is
typically several hours, although subsequent TCH computation
takes less than one minute. These timescales are acceptable
given the one-off nature of the hashing process for a video
record likely to remain in the archive for years or decades.
Given an input video X , hashing each block within X yields
its TCH; a sequence of binary hashes derived from the visual
content: {X1, X2, ..., XT } 7→ ζ = {ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζT } and simi-
larly a sequence of audio hashes ζ ′ = {ζ ′1, ζ ′2, ..., ζ ′T }. These
hashes are stored immutably on the blockchain alongside a
universally unique identifier (UUID) for the clip. To safeguard
the integrity of the verification process, it is necessary to also
store a hash of the video/audio models and PQ models as well
as its corresponding threshold values t also on the blockchain
(Fig. 10). Without loss of generality, we compute the model
Fig. 11. Performance scalability of smart contract transactions on our proof-
of-authority Ethereum implementation. Performance for fetching (top) and
commiting (bottom) video integrity records to the on-chain storage. Measured
for db sizes from 101−105 reported as Ktps (×103 transactions per second).
hashes via SHA-256. Use of such a bit-wise hash is valid for
the model (but not the video) since the model (which is a
set of filter weights) remains constant but the video may be
transcoded during its lifetime within the archive. The proposed
system requires that the models be stored off-chain due to
storage size limitations (32Kb per transaction in our Ethereum
implementation), and the potential for reversibility attack
on the model itself which might otherwise apply generative
methods [66] to enable partial disclosure of timed-release or
non-public archival records. Such reversals are not feasible for
the 256 bit PQ hashes stored on the chain, particularly given
the off-chain storage of the PQ and DNN models.
The TCHs, threshold values and SHA-256 hashes of the
video/audio/PQ models necessary for the integrity verification
of video X are stored inside a SIP which is then submitted
as a record to the blockchain by way of a smart contract
transaction which manages the storage and access of data. In
order to submit data the user must be given access via the
smart contract, which the application interfaces (APIs) then
use to manage access to the submission functionality. Once
the transaction is processed, the UUIDs for the SIP and the
video files can be used to access data stored on the chain
for subsequent verification. For reasons of sustainability and
scalability of the system, we opted on a proof-of-authority
(PoA) consensus model. Under such a model, there is no need
for computationally expensive proof of work mining. Rather,
blocks are sealed at regular intervals by majority consensus of
the clique of nodes pre-authorised to. In our trial deployment
over a small number of archives, access keys were pre-granted
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Fig. 12. Ethereum dashboard snapshot of the ARCHANGEL system during early stages of deployment, showing real-time statistics about the state of the
network nodes, blocks, and transactions. The active nodes include 5 client nodes and 3 sealing nodes which later expand to 15 nodes in total (National
Archives UK x 2, Australia x 1, Estonia x 1, Norway x 1, USA x 1; also ODI x 1, UoS x 8). To ensure a smooth trial the University of Surrey maintained a
50% + 1 share of the nodes, so that new addresses could be easily added without coordination of other parties. In a real-world system all parties would have
the same number of nodes, and a consensus from all parties would be required.
and distributed by us. In a larger deployment (or to scale this
trial deployment) the PoA model could be used to grant access
via majority vote to new archives or memory institutions
wishing to join the infrastructure.
B. Blockchain statistics
ARCHANGEL was first setup at the University of Surrey
(UoS) and the Open Data Institute (ODI). We conducted a
trial study initially at the National Archives of three nations,
namely the United Kingdom, Norway and Estonia; later also
include the United State of America (USA) and Australia. The
smart contracts implementing APIs for the fetch (i.e. search for
and read a record) and write (commit new record) are deployed
on an Ethereum PoA network with geth used for client API
access and for block sealing at each of the 5 participating
archives. A further four block sealing nodes were present on
the network for debug and control purposes. For purposes of
evaluation the network was run privately between the nodes
and genesis block configured with a 15 second default block
sealing rate. The sealing rate limits the write (not fetch) speed
of the network, so that worst-case transaction processing could
be up to 15 seconds. The smart contract implemented fetch
functionality via the view functions provided by the Solidity
programming language, which only read and do not mutate
the state, hence not requiring a transaction to be processed.
To test the smart contract we devised a test of writing a
number of records to the store, measuring the time taken to
create and submit a transaction, and then reading a record a
number of times to measure the time taken to read from the
store. When writing the records we submitted them in batches
of 1000 to ensure that the transactions would be accepted by
the network. The transaction creation/submission performance
is presented in Fig. 11 (top) and do not include the (up to)
15 second block sealing overhead since this is a constant
dependent on the time at which the commit transaction is
posted. The transactions were submitted in powers of 10, and
then the read performance was measured (Fig. 11 (bottom)).
A dashboard snapshot of the Ethereum network is included in
Fig. 12.
C. Limitations
Currently ARCHANGEL is limited by Ethereum (rather
than via design) to block sizes of 32Kb. Our TCHs for a
given video are variable length bit sequences requiring 576 bits
per minute to encode audio and video on-chain (256-bit com-
pressed TCH plus 32-bit threshold value for each video/audio
minute), plus offsets for model hashes and other meta data
in SIP. This effectively limiting the size of digital videos we
can handle to 4 hours maximum duration. ARCHANGEL also
has a relatively high overhead in off-chain storage in that
a model of 50Mb must be stored per video; however this
model size is frequently dwarfed by the video itself which
may be gigabytes in length and presented minimal overhead
in the context of the petabyte capacities of archival data
stores. One interesting question is how to archive such models;
currently these are simply Tensorflow model snapshots but no
open standards exist for serializing DNN models for archival
purposes. As deep learning technologies mature, and become
further ingrained within autonomous decision making e.g. by
governments, it will become increasingly important for the
community to devise such open standards to archive such
models.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed HAAE – a novel self-supervised content
hashing network for arbitrary-length archival videos. We train
a lightweight model for each of the audio/video content
streams for an individual video, modelling the temporal co-
herence between spatial features using a customised autoen-
coder with hierarchical structure and attention mechanism. We
have demonstrated our HAAE effective in modelling videos
lasting from few seconds to hours on 3 archival-representative
benchmarks. We report our LSTM-based HAAE efficient in
modelling long videos while the short videos may benefit from
the simpler HAAE-TDNN version. We show our system robust
against format shift (changes in the video codecs) and motion
(static or fast moving scene); also be able to detect frame
dropout/truncation or corruption due to either accidental bulk
transcoding errors or direct attacks.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MULTIMEDIA 14
Our HAAE system is integrated in ARCHANGEL –
a PoA blockchain-based service for ensuring the integrity
of digital video across multiple archives. A key contribu-
tion of ARCHANGEL is the fusion of computer vision
and blockchain to immutably store temporal content hashes
(TCHs) of video into a private Ethereum distributed ledger
network, overcoming the limitations of bit-level hashes like
SHA-256/MD5. The hashes could be used to verify the
integrity of the original archival video, should it be released in
future, in any new formats. ARCHANGEL has been trialled
across the national government archives of 5 sovereign nations.
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